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Time for a Political Climate Change?: How Elected Leaders 
Influence Constituent Climate Change Attitudes 
 
Alexis Jackson and Karen Villalba-Acosta, Washington University in St. Louis 
Dr. Tat Chan, Advisor 
Abstract: Among the counties bearing the greatest costs of climate change and natural 
disasters, belief in global warming is lower. Our research explores this counterintuitive 
relationship between experience of climate change and belief in climate change using Yale 
Climate Change Project, elected officials rosters, and FEMA data from 2014 - 2019. Our 
difference-in-difference regression model measures the county-level interaction effect of five 
types natural disasters (hurricanes, wildfires, winter storms, severe storms, earthquakes) and the 
partisanship of elected officials. We predict that the partisanship of a county’s elected officials 
has a greater effect on the county’s belief in climate change than the experience of climate 
change itself through FEMA-recognized natural disasters. This analysis raises questions of how 
political parties discuss, portray, and weaponize climate change to shape voting behavior and 
political attitudes toward the subject.  
 
Replication Materials:  
Bohr, Jeremiah. (2014). “Public views on the dangers and importance of climate change: 
predicting climate change beliefs in the United States through income moderated by party 
identification.” Climatic Change 126: 217–227, doi: 10.1007/s10584-014-1198-9 
Howe, Peter D., et al. (2015). “Geographic variation in opinions on climate change at state and local scales in the 
USA.” Nature Climate Change, doi:10.1038/nclimate2583. 
“Disasters.” FEMA.gov, www.fema.gov/disasters. 
“GovTrack.us.” GovTrack.us, www.govtrack.us/. 
 
ccording to a recent study conducted 
by the Pew Research Center, the 
United States ranks among the bottom in the 
percentage of residents who view climate 
change as a pressing issue. Out of 26 
countries, the United States placed 21st 
above only Indonesia, Poland, Russia, 
Nigeria and Israel (Poushter and Huang 
2019).  
     Moreover, among the Americans 
surveyed in the study, Republicans and 
those who lean Republican are 56 percent 
less likely to believe that global climate 
change is a major threat to their country than 
Democrats and those who lean Democrat 
(Poushter and Huang 2019).  
     
     Academic research also supports the 
relationship between Republican party 
affiliation and belief in climate change. 
Irrespective of income and education level, 
Republicans are less likely to believe in 
climate change (Hamilton 2009; Bohr 2014). 
     Despite rejecting the notion of climate 
change, Republicans often reside in the 
counties most effected by climate change 
itself. The Brookings Institution quantified 
the monetary impacts of climate change 
damage at the county level and determined 
that the counties that will incur the greatest 
costs from climate change damage tend to 
lean Republican (Muro et. al. 2019).  
A 
     Using the Brookings data, we constructed 
a simple linear regression to measure the 
effect of a county’s projected climate change 
cost on its average climate attitude. This 
regression shows a significant, inverse 
relationship between climate change cost 
and belief (Appendix 1). Our simple 
regression boasts a low correlation 
coefficient, signaling that other factors are 
needed to explain this seemingly 
counterintuitive relationship between the 
variables (Appendix 2). As the Brookings 
data appears to suggest, perhaps partisanship 
is a better predictor of climate attitudes than 
experiencing climate change itself. 
     Political behavior research demonstrates 
that the average partisan forms their issue-
based beliefs by aligning with the platform 
their political party promotes (Converse 
1964). Instead of updating their opinions 
when new information is received, partisans 
tend to adjust their interpretation of the 
information to match their preexisting 
beliefs on the issue (Gaines et. al. 2007). 
     This raises an important question about 
the role of elected officials and political 
parties in sharing consistent, factual 
information about climate change in an 
effort to increase belief in the phenomenon 
among constituents of all political stripes. 
The disconnect between the two political 
parties on the issue can present a challenge 
for policymakers striving to mitigate the 
looming effects of climate change, 
particularly in the most vulnerable counties.  
     Our study assesses the effects of 
partisanship of elected officials on the 
climate change attitudes of their 
constituents, and whether or not that effect is 
greater than when a constituent experiences 
a climate-related disaster. 
     Using data from the Yale Climate 
Change Project from 2014 – 2019 and 
FEMA, we construct a difference-in-
difference regression to test the county-level 
effects of both partisanship of elected 
officials, presence of a climate-related 
disaster, and the interaction effect between 
these elected officials and various disasters. 
    We find that Republican leadership has an 
inverse effect on climate attitudes following 
a natural disaster, on average. We also 
observe a decline in overall climate attitudes 
between 2016 – 2019.  
 
Climate Change Attitudes 
 
     There is a robust body of work measuring 
climate change attitudes of Americans along 
different demographic factors. Most studies 
include income, age, gender, and education 
level in their analysis.  
     There is an inverse relationship between 
belief in climate change and income level 
(Bohr 2014). This relationship is also true 
with education level (Hamilton 2009). The 
effects of age and gender on climate change 
belief are more muted (Hornsey et. al. 
2016).  
     The effects of an American’s geographic 
location on their belief in climate change 
varies greatly depending on the region 
surveyed. Proximity to the coast tends to 
lead to higher believes in climate change 
(Brody et. al. 2012). However, even after 
suffering a severe drought in 2012, 
Midwestern residents in the United States 
did not demonstrate a heightened belief in 
climate change (Carlton et. al. 2016). 
     Another important measure is the effect 
of unseasonal weather on Americans’ belief 
in climate change. From a sample of 5,000 
phone calls to New Hampshire residents, 
respondents were more credulous about 
climate change on unseasonably warm days 
than on unseasonably cold days (Hamilton 
and Stampone 2013). 
     Nearly all of these studies include a 
moderating variable for a respondent’s 
political affiliation. Accounting for 
partisanship, Bohr, Hamilton, and Carlton 
et. al. find a decreased belief in climate 
change among self-identified Republicans,  
irrespective of the other variables in the 
analysis (Bohr 2014; Hamilton 2009; 
Hornsey et. al. 2016). 
     As partisanship emerges as the variable 
most predictive of climate change attitudes, 
the research paradigm must shift away from 
identifying ‘who’ believes in climate change 
to explaining ‘why’ one might believe in the 
phenomenon, and vice versa (Hornsey et. al. 
2016). 
 
Influence of Elected Leaders 
 
     One force that may be driving individual 
attitudes toward climate change is the issue 
position of their elected official. Political 
behavior research demonstrates that elected 
officials and political party leaders play a 
significant role in shaping the issue-based 
attitudes of the general electorate.  
     Political scientist Philip Converse first 
introduced the idea that party identification 
is the best predictor of voting behavior. 
Converse demonstrated that while the issue-
based attitudes of Americans shifted over 
time, their party affiliations remained 
constant. Converse attributed the shift in 
issue positions to Americans’ attempt to 
align with their political parties as the issue 
positions of the parties evolved (Converse 
1964). 
     Converse’s findings suggest that 
Americans are more likely to choose their 
issue positions based on their political party 
than choose their party based on their issue 
positions. Once party allegiance is 
established, Americans are less likely to 
accept new information that would counter 
the issue positions of their party. Rather, 
partisans tend to interpret information in a 
way that affirms their preexisting beliefs 
(Gaines et. al. 2007). This behavior 
complicates the process of disseminating 
factual information to Americans of all 
partisan stripes. 
     Recent response to the COVID-19 
pandemic illustrates the severity of the 
partisan divide in America. In a NPR poll 
from March 2020, over 50 percent of 
Republicans considered the threat of the 
coronavirus to be ‘exaggerated,’ compared 
to less than 20 percent of Democrats 
(NPR/PBS Newshour/Marist Poll 2020).  
     Much of the variance in partisan response 
to the virus can be attributed to the rhetoric 
of elected officials in each party. Until 
recently, President Donald Trump 
downplayed the severity of the virus, 
comparing it to the ‘seasonal flu.’ 
Republican representative Devin Nunez of 
California even encouraged constituents to 
continue to dine out after health officials 
recommended the opposite. Conversely, 
Democratic governors in states like 
California and New York quickly declared 
states of emergency and urged residents to 
shelter in place (Brownstein 2020).  
     While the geographical outbreak of the 
virus certainly plays a role in its partisan 
response, elected officials are also at fault. 
Just as Converse predicted in 1964, many 
Americans have formed their attitude about 
the virus from those of their party leaders. 
 
Hypothesis 
 
     Belief in climate change may follow a 
similar trend as COVID-19. As the parties 
take clear and distinct stances on the issue, 
Americans could be following suit, 
regardless of how climate change may be 
affecting their everyday lives.  
    Our regression model will explore this 
phenomenon by testing the effect of party 
leadership and climate disasters on 
constituents’ climate attitudes. Following 
the results of prior research on climate 
attitudes, we predict that party leadership 
will have a greater effect on constituents’ 
attitudes than experiencing climate change 
itself.  
     We believe that our research will be 
valuable to policymakers and organizational 
leaders seeking to align the message on climate change and spur policy action. 
 
Data 
 
Climate Change Sentiment 
 
     Our source of climate change sentiment data was Yale Climate Change Project from 2014 – 
2019 (Howe et al. 2015).  In this study, the average value of percentage belief in climate change 
per county was 61.99 with a 6.11 standard deviation. 
 
Figure 1: Climate Change Sentiment Throughout Experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average Climate Change Sentiment 2014-2019 
 
 
 
Climate Change Sentiment
Year
Average of Climate 
Sentiment %
2014 59.09
2016 64.68
2018 63.99
2019 60.19
Grand Total 61.99
Federal Elected Officials 
 
     We used publicly available data through govtrack.gov to gather information on each county’s 
Senators and Member(s) of Congress. 
     After overlaying the climate change sentiment data with partisan senatorial data, political 
trends emerged. Over the course of the years studied, counties with two Democratic Senators 
showed a higher percentage of climate change belief.  
 
Figure 3: Average Climate Change Sentiment by Elected Senators 2014-2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Average Climate Change Sentiment by Percentage of House Representation 
 2014-2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governors  
 
     Due to the lack of a centralized database of State Governors, we manually gathered data on 
Governors through State websites.  
     Similar to the data for federal officials, the gubernatorial data demonstrated an increased 
belief in climate change over the course of our study in states with a Democratic Governor. 
 
Figure 5: Average Climate Change Sentiment by Elected Governors 2014-2019 
 
 
Natural Disasters 
 
     Our climate disaster data encompassed four years and five types of disasters as categorized by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Over the course of the years we studied, there 
were 135 wildfires, 63 earthquakes, 3,320 severe storms, 411 winter storms, and 1,267 
hurricanes in the United States.  The table below details the distribution of disasters across the 
years we studied. 
 
Figure 6: Natural Disasters Total 2016-2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Natural Disasters
Year Hurricane Wildfire Winter Storm Severe Storm Earthquake
2016 359 0 237 807 0
2018 472 135 21 1291 5
2019 436 0 153 1222 58
Grand Total 1267 135 411 3320 63
Figure 7: Total Natural Disasters by Type 2014-2019 
 
 
Figure 8: Climate Change Sentiment by Occurrence of Hurricane 2014-2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Climate Change Sentiment by Occurrence of Winter Storm 2014-2019 
 
 
Figure 10: Total Natural Disasters by Type 2014-2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Climate Change Sentiment by Occurrence of Earthquake 2014-2019 
 
 
 
Methods 
 
Variables 
 
     To select our dependent variable from the Yale climate data, we conducted a Two-Factor 
Analysis.  
Figure 12: Two-Factor Analysis Component Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Component Matrix
a
Variable Name Component
happening 0.965
human 0.957
worried 0.955
harmUS 0.949
devharm 0.943
futuregen 0.935
timing 0.921
consensus 0.91
CO2limits 0.902
supportRPS 0.89
personal 0.842
fundrenewables 0.795
regulate 0.721
Extraction Method: Principal
Component Analysis.
a
a. 1 components extracted.
     This procedure analyzed the variability 
between responses to each survey question. 
The question, “Do you believe climate 
change is happening?” explained 96.5 
percent of the variability in the responses. 
Therefore, we believe that this survey 
question alone captures the general climate 
change sentiment of the population across 
the range of the survey questions.  
     To select our independent variables, we 
began with sorting the FEMA natural 
disasters data. We chose to include 
wildfires, earthquakes, severe storms, winter 
storms, and hurricanes in our analysis 
because instances of these natural disasters 
have been linked to climate change. The 
FEMA data was the only data set in our 
analysis not available on a county-level, 
meaning that any county in a state with a 
FEMA-recognized natural disaster was 
assigned a “1” for that disaster type in a 
given year.  
     To code for the partisanship of elected 
officials, we used an indicator variable. 
Republican Senators received a 0.5 for each 
county they represent. Republican 
Congressmembers were assigned to a county 
through a weighted average based on the 
population distribution of each 
congressional district. 
     To analyze the way in which each 
category of elected officials interacted with 
the FEMA-recognized natural disasters, we 
included fifteen interaction terms. These 
terms indicate if the effect of one 
independent variable on the dependent 
variable is different at each value of the 
other independent variable.  
 
Regression 
     To construct our regression, we used a 
difference-in-difference approach to account 
for the county fixed effect. With this model, 
every independent variable and interaction 
term is equal to the difference between that 
year’s value and the value of the previous 
year.  
     We also accounted for the year fixed 
effect to mitigate any causality issues with 
our regression. To ensure that our regression 
measured the effect of elected officials on 
climate attitudes and not the reverse, we 
included two indicator variables. With only 
four years to measure, we are working in 
differences. This means that the intercept 
represents the differences in climate 
attitudes observed between 2014 – 2016; 
2016 – 2018 represents the difference 
between 2016 – 2018; and 2018 – 2019 
represents the difference between 2018 – 
2019. 
     We used an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression to test our hypothesis 
because our independent variable was 
continuous.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 13: Regression Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression Results 
Variables Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
2014-2016 5.53046 0.04575 120.873 < 2e-16 ***
2016-2018 -6.13525 0.0616 -99.597 < 2e-16 ***
2018-2019 -9.46385 0.06508 -145.417 < 2e-16 ***
Hurricane 1.14405 0.20999 5.448 5.22E-08 ***
Wildfire 0.67081 0.35345 1.898 0.05774 .
Severe Storm 0.42857 0.11842 3.619 0.0003 ***
Winter Storm 0.15706 0.24045 0.653 0.51365
Earthquake 1.60044 0.41696 3.838 0.00013 ***
Republican Senator 1.3612 0.14354 9.483 < 2e-16 ***
Republican Rep 0.89115 0.12586 7.08 1.54E-12 ***
Republican Governor -0.46664 0.08154 -5.723 1.08E-08 ***
Senator * Hurricane 0.45964 0.2101 2.188 0.02871 *
House Rep * Hurricane -1.59286 0.19277 -8.263 < 2e-16 ***
Governor * Hurricane -0.6331 0.19896 -3.182 0.00147 **
Senator * Wildfire -1.21148 0.47161 -2.569 0.01022 *
House Rep * Wildfire 0.28224 0.55937 0.505 0.61387
Governor * Wildfire NA NA NA NA
Senator * Severe Storm 0.29488 0.11855 2.487 0.01289 *
House Rep * Severe Storm -1.39982 0.12007 -11.658 < 2e-16 ***
Governor * Severe Storm 0.31289 0.10111 3.095 0.00198 **
Senator * Earthquake NA NA NA NA
House Rep * Earthquake -0.13711 0.77832 -0.176 0.86017
Governor * Earthquake NA NA NA NA
Senator * Winter Storm 1.04087 0.32871 3.166 0.00155 **
House Rep * Winter Storm 1 -1.37403 0.31105 -4.417 1.01E-05 ***
Governor * Winter Storm 0.35601 0.20546 1.733 0.08317 .
Notes:
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 2.213 on 9400 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.7601,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.7595 
F-statistic:  1354 on 22 and 9400 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
Results 
 
     Our results present several important 
findings for understanding political behavior 
as it relates to climate change. To best 
interpret our coefficients, we will begin with 
the results by each natural disaster category, 
followed by the year fixed effects, and 
finishing with a discussion of the 
implications of our findings. 
 
Hurricane 
 
     The Hurricane coefficient can be 
interpreted as the increase in climate change 
belief following a hurricane in a county 
where all elected leaders are Democrats (all 
indicator variables are equal to zero). With a 
Republican Senator, counties report a 0.45 
percent increase in climate change belief. 
However, with a Republican 
Congressmember and/or Governor, it 
decreases climate change belief by 1.59 and 
0.63 percent, respectively. Therefore, in a 
county that has a Republican in each post 
included in our analysis, the overall effect 
on climate attitudes following a hurricane 
would be a decline of 0.62 percent. 
 
Wildfire 
 
     The Wildfire coefficient is not 
statistically significant. One possible 
explanation for this result could be the 
recent California wildfires caused by the 
poor maintenance of a P&G electric line 
(not a climate-related cause). The human 
cause of this disaster could have influenced 
the way in which constituents relate 
wildfires to climate change. 
     Because the coefficient is not statistically 
significant, we must assume an effect of 
zero as a starting point from which we can 
compare the wildfire interaction effects. 
With a Republican Senator, belief in climate 
change decreases by 1.21 percent. 
Republican Congressmembers do not have a 
statistically significant impact. Republican 
Governors show an effect of “N/A” because 
no wildfire was registered under a 
Republican Governor’s term throughout the 
years of our study. Therefore, in a county 
that has at least one Republican Senator, the 
overall effect on climate attitudes following 
a wildfire would be a decline of 1.21 
percent. 
 
Severe Storm 
 
     For a severe storm, climate sentiment 
increases by 0.43 percent with a Democrat 
in every post we included. With a 
Republican Senator and/or Republican 
Governor, this belief increases by 0.29 and 
0.31 percent, respectively. However, with a 
Republican Congressmember, belief in 
climate change decreases by 1.40 percent. 
Therefore, in a state that has a Republican in 
each post included in our analysis, the 
overall effect on climate attitudes following 
a severe storm would be a decline of 0.37 
percent. 
 
Winter Storm 
 
     The Winter Storm coefficient is also not 
statistically significant. Winter storms are 
often the most politically polarizing disaster, 
used as an argument against the Earth’s 
warming. In fact, many of President 
Trump’s attacks on global warming are 
related to the increase of snowstorms in the 
U.S. (Cheung 2020). The conflicting 
discussion on the cause of winter storms 
could be responsible for the statistically 
insignificant result. 
     Starting from an assumption of zero 
effect, having a Republican Senator 
increases a county’s climate change belief 
by 1.04 percent following a winter storm. 
With a Republican Congressmember, 
climate change belief decreases by 1.37 
percent. For a Republican Governor, the 
interaction term is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, with a Republican 
Senator and Congressmember, a county has 
a 0.33 percent overall decline in climate 
change belief following a winter storm. 
 
Earthquake 
 
     After an earthquake, belief in climate 
change increases by 1.60 percent with a 
Democratic leader in every post we 
included. The earthquake interaction term is 
not significant with a Republican 
Congressmember and is not observable 
under Republican senatorial or gubernatorial 
leadership. We cannot make a decisive 
conclusion about the interaction effect of 
Republican leadership and an earthquake, 
likely due to the rarity of the event.  
 
Year Fixed Effect 
 
     Perhaps the most striking trend in our 
data is the decreased climate sentiment 
observed between 2014 – 2019. Our 
intercept represents a 5.53 percent increase 
in climate change belief between 2014 – 
2016. After 2016, belief in climate drops by 
6.13 percent between 2016 – 2018 and by 
9.46 percent between 2018 – 2019. These 
values signal an overall decline in climate 
change sentiment across the country, despite 
an increase in climate-related disasters 
during the same time frame.  
     One explanation of this trend could be 
the election of President Trump in 2016. The 
President’s climate policy departs markedly 
from that of President Obama. President 
Trump has called climate change “a hoax” 
and repeatedly denied global warming 
through tweets (Cheung 2020). With a 
difference-in-difference model, we cannot 
test the effect of a Republican presidency on 
county-level climate change belief, as the 
indicator variable would be uniform across 
our model. However, if we were able to 
gather a greater expanse of climate change 
sentiment data spanning several presidential 
administrations, we could observe a greater 
variation in general climate attitudes under 
different parties. If former Vice President 
Joe Biden wins the 2020 presidential 
election, future Yale Climate Change Survey 
Data should be able to capture the “Election 
Effect” of a Democratic President compared 
to the tenure of President Trump. 
 
Hypothesis Revisited 
 
     Our hypothesis conjectured that the 
partisanship of elected officials would have 
a greater effect on climate attitudes than the 
experience of a natural disaster. Our 
research results confirm our hypothesis 
when analyzing the difference in climate 
change belief following a natural disaster 
under Republican leadership (the interaction 
term in our model). Across all interaction 
terms, counties report a 0.69 percent average 
decrease in climate change belief following 
a natural disaster under Republican 
leadership. Therefore, it follows that two 
counties who experience the same natural 
disaster under all-Democratic leadership and 
all-Republican leadership will report a 0.69 
lower climate change belief in the 
Republican treatment condition.  
     This result is consistent with that of 
political behavior research. As the two 
political parties establish their distinct 
positions on climate change, individual 
partisans will assume the issue position of 
their party, and will interpret the 
significance of a climate-related event in a 
way that aligns with their party’s position on 
climate change itself. In this sense, our 
hypothesis is correct. Elected officials have 
a greater effect on climate attitudes than the 
experience of climate change itself, as it is 
the partisanship of elected officials that 
determines the way in which an individual 
responds to the presence of a climate-related 
disaster.  
     This logic best explains the results of our 
simple regression using the Brookings 
climate change cost data. Counties with the 
highest projected climate costs are less 
likely to consider climate change a threat. 
These counties are also overwhelmingly 
Republican. Therefore, as our paper 
suggests, the ability for partisan leaders to 
influence the way in which climate events 
are interpreted is likely what drives this 
difference in climate attitudes, not the 
increased occurrence of climate change 
disasters in these regions. 
     It is worth noting, however, that the 0.69 
percent difference in climate attitudes 
between all-Republican and all-Democratic 
counties following a natural disaster is quite 
minimal. While elected officials in each 
party take a distinctly different average 
position on the issue, these leaders are still 
confined to the norms of their position as 
elected officials. In the wake of a natural 
disaster, playing partisan politics is 
generally considered to be inappropriate. 
Therefore, the minimal difference in climate 
attitudes between Republican and 
Democratic constituents is likely a reflection 
of the small—but observable—difference in 
the disaster response of elected partisans.  
 
Conclusion 
 
     Our data paints a complicated picture of 
climate attitudes in America. On average, 
climate attitudes decrease following a 
natural disaster under Republican leadership 
relative to Democratic leadership. As the 
threat of climate change continues to grow, 
elected officials of all partisan stripes have 
the responsibility to unite the American 
people on the issue and mitigate the 
environmental, economic, and health-related 
harm that may result from a denial of its 
impact.  
     Further research should employ textual 
analysis to explore the climate change 
rhetoric of elected officials before and after 
a natural disaster to better understand what 
drives the difference between climate 
attitudes under Republican and Democratic 
leaders. As counties accumulate costs from 
climate-related disasters, elected leaders 
must ask themselves: what is the value of 
my issue position and how much am I 
willing to let my constituents sacrifice to 
maintain that position? 
     Further, the declining belief in climate 
change from 2016 – 2019 presents another 
challenge for elected leaders. Whether or not 
future research finds a causal link between 
the President’s climate change position and 
decreasing climate attitudes, tomorrow’s 
leaders bear a considerable burden in 
reversing this decline. 
     If political behavior research holds true, 
the decline in climate attitudes among the 
general public is influenced by the lackluster 
response to climate disasters across elected 
leaders. If the United States truly seeks 
action on climate change, it might be time 
for a political change as well. 
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Appendix 1: Regression Results County Damages on Climate Sentiment 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 60.34065442 0.137132251 440.0179669 0 
TotalPop 8.44708E-06 4.12984E-07 20.45377161 2.17144E-87 
Total damages (% county income) -0.175213818 0.018304921 -9.571951645 2.05044E-21 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics County Damages on Climate Sentiment 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.378447864 
R Square 0.143222785 
Adjusted R Square 0.142676894 
Standard Error 5.76699166 
Observations 3142 
 
